

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 21 1954

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)  
Colonel W. H. Hennig, USA (G-2)  
Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (ONI)  
Colonel William S. Boyd, USAF (AFON-2B2)  
Captain Ray Malpass, USN (JIG)

SUBJECT : NIE 71-54: Probable Developments in  
North Africa

1. The attached terms of reference, indicating the allocations of production responsibility, were agreed on at the meeting of the IAC representatives on 19 July.

2. It is requested that contributions be received in this Office by the close of business on 3 August.

*Paul A. Borel*  
PAUL A. BOREL  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**VOID**  
DOCUMENT NO.  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE  
AUTH: AF 70-2  
DATE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 July 1954

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 71-54: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS  
IN NORTH AFRICA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable developments in North Africa.

SCOPE

NIE 71-54 is designed as a revision of NIE 69, "Probable Developments in North Africa" (12 September 1952), which attempted to look ahead as far as feasible and estimate the probable trends in the conflict between European authority and native nationalism over the long as well as the short run. Much of the statistical data and analyses of the current situation have become outdated, and the heightened tension in North Africa has speeded the development of certain foreseen trends.

Nevertheless, the basic elements in the situation upon which NIE-69 depended have remained relatively constant, and those portions requiring considerable alteration appear neither extensive nor critical enough to make a wholly new estimate necessary. Therefore, we believe that: (a) most of the basic background data need not be revised; (b) in other cases only small adjustments need be made in the text of NIE-69; and (c) we need only revise and update the existing estimate rather than prepare a wholly new one.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

The modified terms of reference below: (a) indicate those portions of NIE-69 which we believe will not need much rewriting, and (b) ask for contributions on those portions which require more extensive revision and updating. In addition, the contributors should also feel free to suggest any further revisions in sections which we have not considered would require detailed new contributions.

The supplement to NIE-69, "The Current Situation in North Africa" (12 September 1952), was published to serve mainly as background information, and we believe that a revised version need not be included with the present estimate.

**QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM****I. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF NORTH AFRICA (paras. 12-16)**

We believe that this section remains adequate except for the largely factual updating requested below:

Defense

- A. Have US agreements with other Mediterranean powers affected the importance of military base facilities in North Africa? What is the present nature of US, UK, and French base programs in the area?

Defense

- B. Are there any new figures on the military manpower available from French North Africa? How many physically fit natives of military age meet French standards for colonial troops? How many are in the French Army? How many serve in North Africa?

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

- OIR
- C. What is the economic important of North Africa to France, and what is the present extent of French investment there? What proportion of arable land is under European control? Have any new sources of raw material been discovered in the last few years? Has there been any substantial change in French development programs?
- OIR,  
except  
II. I
- II. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FRENCH AND SPANISH NORTH AFRICA (paras. 17-27)
- The more general portions of this section (paras. 17-20 and 24) appear in large measure still accurate, but the rest of the section will require considerable updating to take account of recent developments.
- A. What is the current population by country? How is it broken down between French (i.e., those of French descent), other European, native, and Jewish population?
- B. Have there been any changes in the respective political and economic roles of the French and the natives? What has been the effect of the French reform programs in Morocco and Tunisia? Have there been any changes in the attitude of the "colons"? How great is their influence on the French

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Residencies? On Paris? What are the present roles of the Sultan of Morocco and Bey of Tunis? What is the position of the pro-French native leaders? Have there been any significant changes in the economic situation?

- C. Have there been any changes in the capabilities, intentions, and objectives of the nationalist groups? To what extent are they now committed to extremist policies? What is the relative strength of extremists and moderates? To what extent have the nationalist groups gained or lost popular support by their extremist tactics? Under what circumstances would any moderate nationalist elements now be willing to deal with the French in an attempt to restore stability? Could such elements gain popular support for the cessation of terrorism?
- D. What would be the capabilities and intentions of nationalist groups in a war situation?
- E. What is the present attitude of the nationalists toward the Communists? Would they only accept Communist support, or would they establish a common front? Has Communist strength increased or decreased? Has Communist policy

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

toward the nationalists changed? What is the French Communist Party's strategy and tactics with respect to North African Nationalist movements?

- F.** What is the present extent of cooperation between various nationalist groups?
- G.** Has there been any increase in outside support for the nationalists?
- H.** What is the nature and significance of "fellagah" activity in North Africa? Do they receive any outside support?
- I.** What changes have occurred in French military strength in North Africa (give size and composition of regular and auxiliary French forces in each region)? Have French capabilities for control been reduced?

**Defense**

**III. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (paras. 28-47)**

Many parts of this section (i.e., paras. 28,30-32,35-37, 39, 41-43, and 45-47) appear to require little revision. The remainder will need some updating.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

OIR

- A. International Pressures. What are likely developments in the UN regarding North Africa? How would the nationalists react to success or failure of their cause in the UN? What would be the probable French reaction to unfavorable UN action? Are there any indications of increased Soviet interest in North Africa?

OIR  
Defense

- B. French Intentions. Are any significant changes likely in French policy? Will the French be able to liberalize their reform programs? If they adopt liberal programs, will they be able to keep the colons under control? What effect might the French political situation have on policy formation? What will be the effect of possible Indochina developments?

- C. Likely Future Growth of Nationalist Sentiment

OIR

1. What policies are the nationalists likely to adopt? Under what circumstances would they negotiate with the French? To what extent and under what circumstance would the Communists be likely to gain control of the nationalist movements?

OIR  
Defense

2. Is any change necessary in our estimate of the chances for large-scale nationalist revolt (paras. 38-41)?

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Have nationalist capabilities for violence and concerted military action increased in the short term? In the long term? What are the prospects for the French still being able to retain control?

OIR IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF NORTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS  
(paras. 48-51)

This section appears to require little, if any, revision.

OIR V. PROSPECTS FOR LIBYAN STABILITY AND PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION  
(paras. 52-57)\*

Many of the estimative judgments in this section still appear to be accurate, but considerable revision will be required.

- A. What are the prospects for oil discoveries?
- B. What is the political outlook? The effect of Muntasser's resignation? What are the likely results of the trend toward absolute monarchy? Are separatist tendencies still strong?
- C. What are the prospects for increased Egyptian influence?  
What are Libya's likely relations with the Arab League?
- D. What are the likelihood and probable effects of closer  
Libyan ties with Turkey?

---

\* Since Libya is covered in the NSC policy paper on North Africa, we propose to cover Libyan developments in this estimate rather than in NIE 36-54 on the Arab States.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

- E. What is the likely effect of UK policy toward Libya?**
- F. What is the current outlook for ratification of the  
US and French base agreements?**
- G. How will the issue of North African nationalism affect  
Libya's attitude toward the West? Toward the French  
in the Fazzan?**

**CONFIDENTIAL**